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1) Wimmer, Cederman, Min (2009) Ethnic Politics, Armed Conflict, Am Soc Review

EthnicPoliticsArmedConflict.pdf
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Quantitative scholarship on civil wars has long debated whether ethnic diversity breeds armed conflict. We go beyond this debate and show that highly diverse societies are not more conflict prone. Rather, states characterized by certain ethnopolitical configurations of power are more likely to experience violent conflict. First, armed rebellions are more likely to challenge states that exclude large portions of the population on the basis of ethnic background. Second, when a large number of competing elites share power in a segmented state, the risk of violent infighting increases. Third, incohesive states with a short history of direct rule are more likely to experience secessionist conflicts. Ethnic politics is as powerful and robust in predicting civil wars as is a country’s level of economic development. More diverse states, on the other hand, are not more likely to suffer from violent conflict.

AppendixEthnicPoliticsArmedConflict.pdf
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Appendix with coding rules for the EPR dataset and additional tables

ReplicationEthnicPoliticsArmedConflict.tab
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This data-set is in a country-year format and contains all EPR data, all armed conflicts (ethnic and non-ethnic), and many standard country-level variables in a ready-to-use format.

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7155 Cases

119 Variables

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4) Cederman, Wimmer, Min (2009) Why Ethnic Groups Rebel, World Politics

WhyGroupsRebel.pdf
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Much of the quantitative literature on civil wars and ethnic conflict ignores the role of the state or treats it as a mere arena for political competition among ethnic groups. Other studies analyze how the state grants or withholds minority rights and faces ethnic protest and rebellion accordingly, while largely overlooking the ethnic power configurations at the state’s center. Drawing on a new dataset on Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) that identifies all politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to central state power around the world from 1946 through 2005, we analyze outbreaks of armed conflict as the result of competing ethno-nationalist claims to state power. Our findings indicate that representatives of ethnic groups are more likely to initiate conflict with the government (1) the more excluded from state power they are, especially if they have recently lost power, (2) the higher their mobilizational capacity, and (3) the more they have experienced conflict in the past.

5) Roessler (2009) Ethnic Power Sharing, Coups, and Civil Wars, APSA paper

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Why do rulers employ ethnic exclusion at the risk of provoking civil war? In this paper I argue such a strategy is a function of the commitment problem that arises when power sharing occurs in the shadow of the coup d’état. In Africa rulers require inter-ethnic alliances to maintain societal control, but fear conferring first-strike capabilities upon their rivals. I propose this dilemma causes rulers, in the face of a heightened internal threat from rival elites, to use ethnic exclusion as an institutional shortcut to insulate their grip on power, though at the cost of forfeiting societal control and often committing to civil war. Consistent with this argument I find that on average ethnic exclusion substitutes civil war risk for coup risk. And rulers are more likely to exclude rivals who they perceive represent a credible threat to their hold on power, such as those who formerly controlled the state or who recently attempted to seize power in a failed coup attempt.